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Pp. 311.
The Mediterranean region during the Second World War was in 
many ways the staging area for the eventual defeat of the Axis 
powers. It was here that the United States, along with its British and 
Commonwealth allies, began their major counter-offensives against 
Fascist Italy and Germany leading to heavy combat on land, sea and 
air, culminating in an Allied victory. Andrew Buchanan, a senior 
lecturer at the University of Vermont, offers a new interpretation of 
the U.S. experience in the region with his new book American Grand 
Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II. Buchanan 
argues that the U.S. did not view the Mediterranean as a “peripheral 
theater,” but developed grand-strategic interests in the region which 
were secured by the successful interlinking of political, military and 
economic power. Essentially, the author effectively demonstrates how 
the success of this regional grand strategy allowed the Mediterranean 
to be most accurately described as an “American lake” by the end of 
the war and how the transformation of U.S. strategy occurred over 
time.
The popular narrative of the Mediterranean theatre is that the 
U.S. was more of a reluctant participant in the region, and that it 
was the British who were the leading force behind Allied strategy and 
operations.1 However, the interesting revision offered by Buchanan is 
that U.S. participation was not reluctant and was driven by certain 
U.S. political elites, including President Roosevelt. Interestingly, 
Buchannan compares Roosevelt’s view of grand strategy in the 
Mediterranean to that of famous navalist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who 
emphasised accumulating new bases and zones of control. Roosevelt’s 
regional interests clashed with the strategic tunnel vision of senior 
U.S. military officials who were focused on how to defeat the Axis 
as quickly as possible and were not thinking of the peace that would 
come in the post-war period. The author’s analysis goes well beyond 
1  See James Lacey, “Towards a Strategy: Creating an American Strategy for Global 
War, 1940-1943,” in The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War, 
Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich and James Lacey, eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Michael Howard, The Mediterranean 
Strategy in the Second World War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).
1
Salt: "American Grand Strategy (Book Review)" by Andrew Buchanan
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2018
  35C A N A D I A N  M I L I TA RY  H I S T O RY
just the military sphere of the war, but demonstrates how the U.S. 
utilised diplomatic networks (both formal and informal) as well as 
economic power to help shape the region to acquiesce to its interests. 
For example, Buchanan shows how, starting in 1944, the U.S. used 
its economic might to help rebuild Italy, which gave it considerable 
influence during that country’s post-Fascist political development 
and helped slide it under the umbrella of an emerging U.S.-led liberal 
world order.
The book details the evolution of the U.S. experience in the 
Mediterranean throughout the war. It discusses how the U.S. used a 
mix of diplomatic appeasement and economic relations to guarantee 
Spain’s neutrality and how the U.S. balanced relations between 
the Vichy and the Free French political communities. It outlines 
how, following the launching of Operation Torch, U.S. military and 
diplomatic personnel found themselves with a complicated new task of 
having to administer European colonies in Africa. The later chapters 
of the book deal with the invasion and occupation of Italy and of 
relations with the Balkans. The narrative avoids detailed overviews 
of the operational- and tactical-level fighting, rather focusing the bulk 
of its attention on the political and economic dimensions of the war 
and their interplay with military strategy. To support his analysis, 
Buchanan undertook extensive archival research in both the U.S. and 
U.K. as well as examined the unpublished private papers of several 
key diplomatic figures.
An underlying theme found throughout the book is the interplay 
of the pursuit of a realpolitik approach to national interests and 
the influence of liberal normative factors in shaping U.S. foreign 
policy. Pragmatic realpolitik was often at the forefront of U.S. policy, 
particularly during the early days of the war when the U.S. was in 
a weaker position. For example, Roosevelt recognised the legitimacy 
of the authoritarian Franco government in Spain and the Vichy 
government in France and later upheld stability in French colonial 
Africa. However, liberalism was able to grow in influence as the U.S. 
strategic position grew stronger, and by 1944 the U.S. began to more 
actively reshape the region with liberal principles in mind. Overall, 
Buchanan’s analysis here is sound, yet could have been strengthened 
by engaging with some of the literature on U.S. strategic culture which 
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has extensively examined this interplay of liberalism and pragmatism 
and on how normative factors influence the development of policy.2
At its core, this book is really a story of rising hegemony and 
power transition, where emerging great powers reshape the world 
around them to fit their interests. The international system is 
consistently in a state of flux where states’ capabilities in relation 
to peer actors are either rising or declining.3 Buchanan’s book shows 
how, by the end of 1944, the U.S. was able to surpass the influence of 
the U.K. in the Mediterranean militarily, politically and economically. 
The U.K. lacked the resources possessed by the U.S. and so it was 
Washington, not London, which oversaw the construction of the new 
political dynamics of the region. This process was very complicated as, 
Buchanan observes, “[t]here was no manual—no Global Hegemony 
for Dummies—to guide U.S. policy makers toward becoming the 
predominant power in the capitalist world” (p. 272). However, 
Buchanan concludes that the U.S. managed to overcome these 
difficulties, and the construction of the new liberal world order would 
continue into the post-war era with events such as the establishment 
of the Truman Doctrine.
This book succeeds as a comprehensive and convincing analysis of 
America’s grand strategy in the Mediterranean. It is worthy of study 
by scholars of American diplomatic history, Anglo-U.S. relations, and, 
of course, the Mediterranean region during the Second World War. 
Further, international relations’ scholars interested in the processes of 
peaceful power-transitions and how new global orders are constructed 
will find the work useful. Buchanan’s engaging writing style will 
also appeal to even a casual reader of Second World War history 
interested in something beyond purely military-centric narratives of 
such an important period in human history.
alexander salt, university of calgary
2  For example, Colin S. Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American Example,” 
International Security 6, no. 2 (Fall 1981): 21-47.
3  For more on the nature of Great Power politics, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and 
Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1989); and A.F.K. Organski 
and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
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